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GLOBAL JUSTICEANDTHEBRETTONWOODS
INSTITUTIONS
Frank J. Garcia*
ABSTRACT
Together with the WTO, the Bretton Woods Institutions are the preeminent
international institutions devoted to managing international economic
relations. This mandate puts them squarely in the center of the debate
concerning development, inequality and global justice. This essay explores
how justice criteria might apply to the ideology and operations of the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Using the Rawlsian model of
egalitarian justice adapted to international institutions by the author in
connection with the WTO, this essay asks what difference it would make for
the Bank and Fund if an explicit justice framework informed their
international lending activities.
INTRODUCTION
Global social policy is currently managed through a variety of institutions
including in particular the WTO and what are popularly called the Bretton
Woods Institutions (BWIs): the International Monetary Fund (IMF or the
Fund) and the World Bank (Bank).1 In this essay, I propose to use the
normative analysis I developed for the WTO2 as a model for exploring
* Professor, Boston College Law School, 885 Centre St, Newton, Mass.02459 USA. E-mail:
frank.garcia.1@bc.edu, garciafr@bc.edu. Thanks to Jefffrey Dunoff for his insightful
comments, and to Matthew Hoisington, Daniel Blanchard and Michael Garcia for exceptional
research assistance.
1 By global social policy, I mean (broadly speaking) policies designed and/or implemented
at the trans-national level which affect the creation and allocation of social primary goods
(such as wealth, income rights, opportunities, privileges, status, legal standing, etc.), and the
elaboration of secondary social goods (such as education, employment, health care,
sustenance, security, etc.). In this essay I am focusing on social primary goods and the
institutions which influence their allocation through their policy decisions. Such policies are
obviously formulated and affected by domestic institutions, but also, increasingly, by global
institutions as well. For a comprehensive and insightful overview of the institutions
which manage global social policy, see Bob Deacon, ‘Social Policy in a Global Context’,
in Andrew Hurrell & Ngaire Woods (eds), Inequality, Globalization and World Politics (Oxford,
UK:Oxford University Press, 1999) 211–47.
2 Frank J. Garcia, Trade, Inequality and Justice: Toward a Liberal Theory of Just Trade
(Transnational Publishers, Ardsley, N.Y. 2003); Frank J. Garcia, Trade and Inequality:
Economic Justice and the Developing World, 21 Michigan Journal of International Law 925
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the relationship between justice and the work of the BWIs. Insofar as the
Bank and Fund are social institutions, charged with making decisions
involving the allocation of social resources, their activities are the direct
subject of justice theory. The fact that the Bank and Fund are international
organizations does not alter this fundamental point. In particular, I want to
consider the role of the Bank and Fund as institutions which form part of the
‘basic structure’, those institutions which discharge a fundamental allocative
role in society and are therefore part of the larger inquiry into justice.3
The Bank began when one of its two primary lending organs, the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), was
created in 1945 to help finance European reconstruction. Its mission soon
broadened into supporting development investment on a global scale, and
the IBRD continues to carry out what is often considered the Bank’s core
activity, development lending at preferential (but near-commercial) rates.
The Bank’s second lending institution, the International Development
Association (IDA), was created in 1960 to assist the Bank’s poorest clients
through concessional (zero-interest) lending and outright grants.4
The IMF was created to bring stability to the exchange rate system and
facilitate cooperation on international monetary matters in the aftermath of
the Great Depression.5 Following the demise in the 1970s of the so-called
Bretton Woods system of gold-pegged exchange rates, the Fund’s role has
shifted more towards that of an international financial institution.6 The IMF
engages in short- and medium-term lending of hard or ‘trade’ currencies7 in
response to balance of payments difficulties, with accompanying IMF
‘conditions’ involving domestic policy reforms.8 The IMF carries out
(2000); reprinted in International Law Today (Anthony D’Amato and Jennifer Abbassi, eds)
(West, 2006); Heights of Justice, Lawrence A and Cunningham (eds), (Carolina Academic
Press, Durham, N.C. 2006).
3 Both the Bank and the Fund were conceived at the Bretton Woods Conference to serve
complementary roles in the post-war economy. Bahram Ghazi, The IMF, the World Bank and
the Question of Human Rights (Ardsley, NY, Transnational Publishers, 2005) at 19–37. For an
overview of the concept of a global basic structure and its role in the global justice debate, see
Simon Caney, The Global Basic Structure: Its Nature and Moral Relevance (Paper presented at
the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, 2 September 2004,
http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p58933_index.html).
4 See Ghazi, above n 3, at 19–37.
5 See generally Ghazi, above n 3, at 1–17.
6 See R.M. Lastra, ‘The International Monetary Fund in Historical Perspective’, 3 Journal of
International Economic Law 507 (2000) at 512 (upon demise of exchange rate system, Fund
shifted to broader international financial role).
7 See ibid.
8 The IMF also continues to monitor and investigate member states’ exchange rate policies, and
work to encourage members to remove any exchange controls, though I will not focus on those
activities here. See generally Remarks by Sean Hagan, IMF General Counsel, Proceedings of the
93rd Annual Meeting, American Society of International Law (ASIL), 24–27 March 1999,
115–116.
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this lending through a variety of distinct lending programs or ‘facilities’, each
with different terms and conditions suited to different categories of
borrowers in different types of need.9
In this essay I seek to be ‘normative’ without being ‘prescriptive’. In other
words, my primary aim is to employ a normative framework drawn from
domestic political theory and first adapted to international trade, to suggest
one approach to analyzing the work of the Bank and Fund with respect to
global distributive justice.10 The theoretical challenge is to articulate for the
Bank and Fund specific normative criteria that should inform their policy
choices and operational decisions. In this essay I employ a version of Rawls’
Difference Principle, which I call the International Difference Principle, to
derive initial versions of such normative criteria for the Bank and for the
Fund. I conclude by illustrating the application of such criteria in one area of
Bank and Fund operations, their involvement with the domestic policy of
borrowing states. By doing so, I hope to suggest how introducing justice
explicitly into the ongoing conversation concerning Bank and Fund reform,
alters the nature of the questions asked and offers some guidance as to where
appropriate solutions might lie.
I. INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
INSTITUTIONS
Elsewhere I have summarized my approach to the generation of an
international normative application of domestic political theory,11 based on
my work applying Rawls’ theory of Justice as Fairness to international trade
law.12 Here I will only outline the minimum necessary in order to explain
how this approach forms the basis for the specific application of the theory to
the Bank and Fund in the sections which follow.
9 See Ghazi above n 3, at 10–11.
10 I have initially couched this discussion in terms of global justice, although I believe a true
theory of global justice requires either cosmopolitan or communitarian grounding, or both,
and I offer neither here, relying instead on a more traditional international law/‘society of
states’ model of justice. See Frank J. Garcia, ‘Globalization and the Theory of International
Law’, 11 International Legal Theory 9 (2005) (surveying arguments regarding normative
basis of global justice in globalizing social relations). Thus what I am actually engaging in
here is more properly an international justice argument, or justice between states and with
their citizens, although I believe the substantive conclusions would be quite similar either way.
11 Frank J. Garcia, Developing a Normative Critique of International Trade Law: Special &
Differential Treatment, Working Paper Series No, University of Bremen Transformations of the
State Research Centre, http://www.sfb597.uni-bremen.de/pages/pubAp.php?SPRACHE¼en
(forthcoming).
12 Garcia, above n 2.
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A. International justice as fairness
The initial task is to choose a particular body of normative political theory
through which to develop the analysis of the obligations of justice as they
apply to the BWIs. For a variety of substantive and rhetorical reasons I think
liberalism is the best normative language for modern secular international
law.13 Within liberalism, I have chosen Rawls’ ‘Justice as Fairness’, despite
its complex relationship to international justice,14 because of its approach to
the problem of inequality.
Rawls is particularly concerned with inequalities that arise in the distribution
of social primary goods. The fundamental problem of distributive justice is that
inequalities in natural primary goods (such as intelligence, health and
imagination) often lead, through the operation of social institutions, to
inequalities in the social distribution of social primary goods, such as rights,
privileges, wealth, income, status, opportunities, etc. Such inequalities in social
primary goods are not deserved, since they are deeply influenced by an
underlying natural inequality which is morally arbitrary.
Rawls argues that as a result, the basic structure of society must be
arranged ‘so that these contingencies work for the good of the least
fortunate’.15 Rawls develops this view into the theory of Justice as Fairness,
in particular the ‘Difference Principle’, which states that inequalities in the
distribution of social primary goods are justifiable only to the extent they
benefit the least advantaged. Satisfying this criterion at the domestic level
could entail a variety of social measures, ranging from altering the structure
of incentives to reward actions which benefit the least advantaged, such as
the charitable gifts deduction of the tax code, to the outright redistribution of
private wealth through progressive tax and welfare legislation.16
There are many ways to catalogue similar inequalities in international
economic relations, although the natural inequalities in this case are not
13 Liberalism is the normative tradition of many of the most wealthy and powerful states which
control the BWIs, which are primarily western or western-style liberal democracies. This is
important on topics of international justice, since if you develop arguments for justice in this
language, it is harder for such states to ignore them. Moreover, the BWIs themselves have
roots in the same tradition of liberalism, in particular liberal internationalism. On the
intertwined roots of political liberalism, liberal internationalism, international law and the
modern state system, see Anne Marie Slaughter, ‘International Law in a World of Liberal
States’, 6 European Journal of International Law 1 (1995) at 5–10; Deacon, above n 1, at
223 (acknowledging liberal internationalist roots of IMF).
14 In A Theory of Justice Rawls limits his theoretical enterprize to principles of justice for what he
assumes to be a closed domestic society, which by 1979 was already a questionable
assumption. See Charles Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979) 143–49. Globalization, and other developments in
international relations generally and in international economic relations in particular, have
rendered such assumptions untenable today. See Thomas Franck, Fairness in International law
and Institutions (New York, USA, NY: Oxford University Press, 1995) 12–13 (the requisite
level of community has emerged at the international level to sustain a fairness analysis).
15 See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Belknap Press: Cambridge, 1971) at 102.
16 Ibid at 179.
464 Journal of International Economic Law (JIEL) 10(3)
 at Boston College - Law Library on Septem
ber 29, 2011
jiel.oxfordjournals.org
D
ow
nloaded from
 
individual attributes such as intelligence but national ‘attributes’ such as
geography and climate. With respect to trade, contemporary analyses usually
adopt economic ‘size’ as the most relevant concept by which to evaluate and
measure the impact of inequality on trade liberalization.17 The central insight
from the literature on smaller economies and trade is that smaller economies
share certain characteristics that make their participation in the international
trading system problematic.18 Small size is also an additional complicat-
ing factor affecting a country’s growth, policy options and development
potential.19
These contingencies form the essential context in which any normative
international political theory must operate. Translated into Rawlsian terms,
the characteristics of smaller economies are a complex blend of both natural
and social inequalities. Natural inequalities are strongly reflected in smaller
economy characteristics such as smallness in population, smallness in territory,
and heavy reliance upon commodities exports. Social inequalities are
essentially connected to social institutions, including the smaller economy’s
political and economic systems, prior geopolitical arrangements, and inter-
national economic law and diplomacy, all of which together establish patterns
of distribution of social goods such as wealth, knowledge, rights and privileges
within and between states, which ‘define men’s [sic] rights and duties and
influence their life prospects’.20 Smaller economy characteristics that reflect
social inequalities include their limited human and technological resources,
which reflect both small populations and the effects of social allocations
resulting in inadequate educational and research institutions. Such allocations
are heavily influenced by underlying natural inequalities, and by non-economic
factors such as racial, religious or nationalistic prejudice.
The key normative assumption underlying a Rawlsian account of
inequality is that differences in natural endowments, and consequent
differences in the allocation of social goods, are unmerited. In Rawls’
17 The smallness of an economy will always be determined in comparison with other economies,
usually in terms of per capita GDP, supplemented by population and land size, as rough
indicators of an economy’s human, land and capital resources.
18 Smaller economies are vulnerable when they participate in trade for two reasons: the relative
openness of smaller economies, and the asymmetry between larger and smaller economies in
resources and economic strength. Overall, smaller economies face the risk that the
distribution of benefits and burdens within the trading system will be skewed in favor of
the dominant party. See, e.g. Dermot McCann, ‘Small States in Globalizing Markets: The
End of National Economic Sovereignty’, 34 New York University Journal of International Law
& Policy 281 (2001) (citing broad consensus as to factors leading to smaller economies’
overdependence on exports, and consequent vulnerability).
19 Overcoming Obstacles and Maximizing Opportunities: A Report by the Independent Group
of Experts on Smaller Economies and Western Hemispheric Integration, March 1998, at 2;
see ibid (intensity of pressures facing smaller economies raises question as to their continued
effective sovereignty); Richard L. Bernal, ‘The Integration of Small Economies in the Free
Trade Area of the Americas 9 (Ctr. for Strategic and International Studies, Policy Papers on
the Americas, vol. IX no. 1, 6–10, 1998).
20 Theory of Justice, above n 15, at 7.
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terms, they are morally arbitrary.21 The fact that a particular state should be
favorably situated with respect to natural resources, and that this fact results
in advantages in the acquisition of social goods through the operation of
domestic and international social institutions, does not by itself justify that
state’s claim to the benefits arising from that happy fact of geography.
To accept the status quo without further justification, would be to endorse
a system of natural liberty as one’s principle of justice, which Rawls rejects
as unjust precisely because it allows arbitrary advantages too much sway in
determining life prospects.
Together, these natural inequalities, the arbitrariness of their distribution,
and their social consequences, form the subject of international justice.
The task of international justice is to furnish principles that will serve both
as a standard for evaluating the social response to natural inequalities, and
as a guide to social institutions for making distributive allocations that will
justify social inequalities.
In a Rawlsian approach to international justice, those principles are to be
chosen in the original position.22 Rawls argues in A Theory of Justice that the
representatives would choose principles of justice which maximize the
minimum bundle of social goods they are likely to receive in the face of life’s
inequalities.23 In the domestic original position, the representatives chose
two principles, a principle of equal liberty and a principle of distributive
justice. In Rawls’ account of the second international choice problem,
representatives of states do not in fact choose a principle of distributive
justice.24 However, as has been argued by Beitz, Barry and others, ‘there is
no reason to think that the content of the principles would change as a result
of enlarging the scope of the original position’.25
1. An international difference principle
I therefore follow these theorists and suggest an international difference
principle drawn directly from Rawls’ own domestic elaboration:
(I). International social and economic inequalities are just only if they
result in compensating benefits for all states, and in particular for the least
advantaged states.
21 Ibid at 72.
22 For Rawls, the problem of choice of principles is articulated in terms of the original position,
in which representative individuals must choose principles that will govern their future social
relations under conditions of limited knowledge of the general human condition, and
ignorance as to their particular future socioeconomic situation. Ibid at 152–57.
23 Ibid.
24 Rawls has been criticized for bifurcating the original position into a second, separate choice
problem for interstate principles of cooperation, and for failing to take into account the
evolution of contemporary international law to recognize non-state actors, including
individuals. See Lea Brilmayer, ‘What Use is Rawls’ Theory of Justice to Public
International Law? 6 International Legal Theory 36 (2000); Fernando Teso´n, A Philosophy
of International Law, Ch. 4. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998).
25 Garcia, above n 2, at 134 note 8 and sources cited therein (quoting Christopher Stone).
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Parties to this international original position would view the distribution of
resources in the same manner that parties in the domestic original position
viewed the distribution of natural talents: as morally arbitrary.26 Therefore,
Rawls’ argument should lead to the same conclusion: international social
inequalities are justifiable only if they satisfy the difference principle.
B. International economic institutions and international justice as
fairness
Once the basic principles of justice have been identified, the next step
according to Rawls is ‘to choose a constitution and a legislature to enact
laws, and so on, all in accordance with the principles of justice initially
agreed upon’.27 In the case of international trade, we already have the
equivalent of a constitution and a legislature, though imperfect ones, in the
GATT/WTO system and its attendant rounds of international economic
negotiation and diplomacy.28
1. Operationalizing international justice as fairness: the example of trade law
The difference principle requires that inequalities in the distribution of social
primary goods be justified by their contribution to the well-being of the least
advantaged. At the international level, the doctrine of free trade is key to the
justification of such inequalities. By allowing the principle of comparative
advantage to operate, liberalized trade moves the trading system in the
direction of operating to the benefit of the least advantaged, by affording
them the opportunity for welfare increases through specialization.
However, merely liberalizing trade, which establishes a libertarian system
of equality of opportunity (reciprocal free trade rules), is not adequate to
make the system work to the benefit of the least advantaged, since the reality
of gross inequalities in international endowments undercuts the possibility of
effective equality of rights among states (sovereignty).29 For this reason, the
difference principle suggests that just trade cannot consist only of free trade.
Trade law needs justification according to the difference principle: it should
make inequalities work to benefit least advantaged.
For trade, the key lies in understanding the way many of the natural and
social inequalities among states translate into the relative strength of
26 This conclusion is consistent with the positions taken by the leading proponents of a Rawlsian
theory of international distributive justice. See ibid, at 134 note 6 and sources cited therein.
27 Theory of Justice, above n 15, at 13.
28 On the constitutional and law-making function of trade institutions, and their shortcomings in
this regard, see Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, ‘Constitutionalism and International
Organizations’, 17 Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business 398 (1997); but
see Jeffrey L. Dunoff, ‘Constitutional Conceits: The WTO’s ‘‘Constitution’’ and the
Discipline of InternationalLaw’, 17 European Journal of International Law. 647 (2005)
(arguing that Petersmann’s account is descriptively inaccurate and normatively undesirable).
29 Accord Beitz, above n 14, at 163 (objections to justice of a domestic system of natural liberty
apply with equal force to an international version as well).
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consumer markets and producer groups. States that are rich in natural
resources and have developed significant social resources such as wealth,
industrial capacity and technology, will generally have as a result a strong
consumer market, as manifested in per capita income, and a strong production
base, as manifested in per capita GDP. States that are poor in resources
will generally have a weak consumer market, manifested in low per capita
income, and a weak production base, manifested in low per capita GDP.
This means that market access becomes a key variable in any attempt to
address inequalities through trade law. The International Difference
Principle applied to trade requires that states organize market access in
such a way that it benefits the least advantaged. This can be stated in
normative terms as follows:
(II). In order to justify inequalities in the size of markets, states must
ensure that market access is structured so as to benefit the least
advantaged.
Free trade is a principle of market access, but it is reciprocal market access:
you open yours, and I will open mine. Something more than reciprocal trade
liberalization is needed in order to ensure that market access benefit the least
advantaged.
Trade law offers that something more in the form of special and
differential treatment. At the core of special and differential treatment is
the practice of asymmetric trade liberalization, to secure the benefit of
developed country wealth and resources for the least advantaged states
through non-reciprocal market access. It is this asymmetry which enables
special and differential treatment to play a key role in justifying inequalities
in the international allocation of social goods. By opening their markets to
developing country exports on a preferential basis, developed countries in
effect place the consumption power of their larger, richer consumer market
at the service of the developing country, which can increase its exports and
thereby strengthen its economic base. Such preferential access for developing
countries allows the inequalities that manifest themselves in the form of
wealthy consumer markets to work to the benefit of the least advantaged,
thereby meeting the central criteria for distributive justice.
This conclusion can be restated in normative terms as follows:
(III). In order to justify inequalities in the size of markets, states must
offer preferential market access structured so as to benefit the least
advantaged.
This can be understood as an obligation upon states with respect to how they
structure trade law as a distributive mechanism, in particular how they
structure special and differential treatment, as a condition of the difference
principle.
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In order to more fully determine the necessary contours of such a policy
in practice, we must examine how in fact special and differential treatment
operates in contemporary international trade relations. I will give only an
abridged summary of this process here, in order to illustrate the approach
before turning to the proper objects of inquiry here, the Bank and the
Fund.30
Current applications of the market access aspects of S&D have been
subject to a variety of political constraints and conditions: they are unilateral,
they exclude the most competitive goods, and they impose non-trade related
conditions.31 The difference principle as applied to international trade
suggests that these conditions are not normatively justifiable.32 First, as a
matter of basic justice the unilateralism of existing trade preference programs
must be reconsidered, since justice is not optional and unilateralism favors
the more advantaged.33 Second, the exclusion of the goods most competitive
with the manufactured goods of developed states is truly perverse: instead of
structuring the trading relationship for the benefit of the least advantaged
partner, the import sensitivity exclusion deliberately structures the relation-
ship in favor of the less-competitive domestic industry of the granting state.
Third, by subjecting the actual availability of the preferences to conditions
clearly related to the domestic and foreign policy agendas of the granting
state, GSP programs again turn the normative justification of market
inequalities on its head, benefitting the granting state and not the
beneficiary.34
By examining current special and differential treatment practice in view of
the normative guideline developed above, I further distill policy-specific
criteria with respect to market access programs:
(IV). In order to benefit the least advantaged, preferential market access
(special & differential treatment) must be binding, non-exclusionary, and
unconditional.
These criteria should be observed in the implementation of special and
differential treatment today, if the goal is to implement it in a form that will
reflect justice as fairness and contribute to the justification of the
international trade system.
II. JUSTICE AND THE BRETTON WOODS INSTITUTIONS
In the foregoing section, I have outlined one approach to developing
a normative theory of international economic law, in the area of trade.
30 For a fuller treatment, see above n 2 and n 14 and sources cited therein.
31 See generally Garcia, above n 2, at 155–168.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
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To recap, it involves four steps: first mapping the domestic theory onto the
international subject and generating an international form of the relevant
normative principles, in this case the International Difference Principle;
second, examining the specific nexus between the policy context and the
normative system (i.e. what is the institution allocating?), which was market
access and the terms of market access in the case of trade; third, formulating
at the constitutional level the core distributive principle, derived from the
International Difference Principle, that should guide the institution’s
allocative activity; and fourth, developing specific criteria for policy
development at the operational levels by applying the international normative
criteria to the specific allocative policies of the relevant institution, which are
special and differential treatment in the case of trade.
What remains is to perform this same exercise for the Bank and Fund. As
allocative social institutions created by states, the Bank and Fund make
decisions which influence the distribution of social primary goods, in this
case development capital and hard currencies.35 Therefore, the appropriate
policy nexus, is lending – development capital lending in the case of the
Bank, and balance of payments lending in the case of the Fund. Generating
a normative theory for the BWIs will involve analyzing the lending activities,
terms and policies of the Bank and Fund with reference to distributive justice
criteria stemming from states’ obligation to implement justice in how they set
up the basic structure.
This will involve application of the methodology of the previous section to
the Bank and Fund.36 The first step, derivation of an international normative
principle, has already been taken, resulting in the International Difference
Principle:
(I). International social and economic inequalities are just only if they
result in compensating benefits for all states, and in particular for the least
advantaged states.
35 As mentioned above, (see above n 1), there are other important social primary goods subject
to institutional allocation; and there are many public and private entities and institutions at
both the national and international levels which make decisions influencing the allocation of
these two specific examples of social primary goods, development capital and hard currencies.
The Bank and the Fund stand at the confluence of these two factors, as the principal
international institutions allocating these two kinds of social primary goods; hence my focus
on them here.
36 This is of course a large undertaking—my aim in this essay is to offer a preliminary analysis
and overview of what such an undertaking might involve and reveal. A more extensive but still
preliminary discussion can be found in Frank J. Garcia, Justice, Bretton Woods Institutions and
the Problem of Inequality, ‘Developing Countries in the WTO Legal System’ Conference,
University of Minnesota Law School, May 25, 2007 (on file with author); a definitive
discussion of these issues will involve a book-length treatment, in process.
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Steps two through four will involve identifying the core implications of the
International Difference Principle for Bank and Fund activity.37 I will carry
out this process in sections A and B, respectively.
A. International development lending: the bank and global inequality
1. The bank’s role in international justice
The Bank is a social institution created and managed by states, whose core
activity is to allocate primary social goods: development capital, and the
terms of access to such capital, which are themselves a social good.
Development capital is a socially produced resource. A country’s supply of
development capital reflects a complex blend of natural and social factors.
It reflects the country’s natural resource endowment, and the complex blend
of its history, policies, and trade relations, all of which affect the capacity of
the system to generate surplus capital for development, and the amounts of
such capital.
Since the Bank’s core function with respect to these resources is to
influence their allocation among states through its lending decisions and
policies, this intimately involves the Bank in distributive justice concerns: by
what principles and rules are these social goods allocated, and to whose
benefit? To normatively evaluate this, we need a theory of Just International
Development Lending.
a. Toward a theory of just international development lending
As with trade law we looked at the function of market access, here we look to
the Bank’s role as a lender, specifically a development lender, which suggests
we focus on access to development capital.38 The key normative implication
of Justice as Fairness for development lending is that states do not in a
significant sense deserve their relative supply of development capital, insofar
as it is a product, in part, of natural inequalities which are morally arbitrary,
compounded by social inequalities.39 This means that states cannot be
37 I want to emphasize that in this analysis, I am taking as given that these two institutions exist,
and arguing that given their allocative roles, their operations are subject to the International
Difference Principle. I am not arguing that the International Difference Principle requires the
existence of these two institutions, nor am I arguing that these institutions are the only, or
even best, mechanism through which to address the inequality in distribution of development
capital and hard currencies. Rather, given that states have created [for rational reasons, as I
suggest elsewhere (see above n 36)] global markets for development capital and currency
exchange, and these institutions in particular, the next question is how justice might influence
their operations.
38 Hockett suggests a further theoretical link between justice and lending, or as he puts it
between justice theory and finance theory, on an insurance model, namely, that both involve
risk allocation under conditions of uncertainty. See Robert Hockett, From ‘‘‘Mission Creep’’
to Gestalt Switch: Justice, Finance, the IFIs, and Globalization’s Intended Beneficiaries’,
37 George Washington International Law Review. 167 (2005) at 179–81.
39 In this respect, we do face the problem of how to account for the fact that good social policies
contribute to an abundance of development capital, or the problem of the degree of ambition-
sensitivity of a particular distributive theory. See Garcia, above n 2 at 61. Hockett, for
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presumed to be entitled to their particular supply of development capital,
and that resulting inequalities in the distribution of development capital must
be justified. This has implications for how states structure the Bank’s role as
development capital lender. We can formulate the following, as an
application of the International Difference Principle to the work of the Bank:
(II). In order to justify inequalities in the distribution of development
capital, states must ensure that access to development capital is structured
so as to benefit the least advantaged.
How does this apply to the work of the Bank?
As an initial matter, access to development capital is a function of the
private capital markets. Whenever there is a general or country-specific
economic crisis, however, it is much harder for certain states to borrow
needed development capital on the private market. Moreover, their
demand for development capital exceeds capital-poor states’ ability to pay
commercial rates, so if the only access to development capital was through
private banks at commercial rates, their development capital needs would
go under-supplied.40 Therefore, by putting surplus capital to work on
near-commercial terms in the economies of states without adequate
indigenous supplies of capital, the Bank is conferring a benefit on less
advantaged states.
This brings us to the issue of the terms on which the Bank makes
development capital available. The terms of access to this development
capital are themselves a social resource. In other words, the terms on which
the IBRD makes its development capital available (preferential rates), and
the terms on which the IDA makes its credits and grants available
(concessionary rates) are themselves a further socially produced, and socially
allocated, resource.
In this sense, the Bank’s IBRD lending is similar to the principle of free
trade in WTO – helping to equalize opportunity of access to development
capital in a manner consistent with the basic requirements of Justice as
Fairness. However, in the same manner that with respect to trade, a system
of purely free trade was not enough due to the facts of inequality, I want to
suggest that in development lending a system of pure private market
commercial lending, or even a blended system of private bank commercial
lending and Bank preferential lending, would not be enough. Because the
least advantaged states have limited domestic capital formation capabilities
and limited resources to borrow capital, they cannot get enough through
these avenues, meaning that the overall inequality in capital will not work to
example, suggests in this regard that global distributive justice by BWIs should focus on what
he calls ‘ethically exogenous’ benefits and burdens only. See. Hockett, above n 38, at 193.
40 This was one reason for the formation of the IDA. See Ghazi above n 3, at 24.
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their advantage. Continuing the analogy to free trade from the previous
section, IBRD-style lending is necessary, but not sufficient, for international
justice. It is not enough that capital is made available, even at below-
commercial terms – the International Difference Principle asks much more.
It asks that capital be made available under such terms and in such a
manner, that it benefits the least advantaged.
In terms of the International Difference Principle, this suggests the
following corollary:
(IIA). In order that access to development capital benefit the least
advantaged, states must offer concessional access to development capital.
In this sense, the IDA’s policies and programs are the structural analog in
lending to the WTO’s Special and Differential Treatment policies reviewed
in the trade justice analysis set forth above – concessional access to capital as
a tool for justifying inequality. It is this specific aspect of the Bank’s activities
which most directly addresses the inequality in development capital from the
perspective of the least advantaged.
This brings us to the third step in the process, which can be restated in
normative terms as follows:
(III) In order to justify inequalities in the distribution of development
capital, states must offer concessional access to development capital that is
structured so as to benefit the least advantaged.
In order to fully reflect the International Difference Principle in its mission
and operations, the Bank must ensure that its concessional lending programs
will actually benefit the least advantaged.
2. Operational implications of a theory of just international development lending
How can this normative agenda be carried out at the operational level?
In this essay, I will focus on only one area of inquiry: how the Bank
determines the nature and extent of its involvement in the domestic policies
of borrowing state.41
a. The bank’s role in domestic social policy
Consistent with its prudential obligations, the Bank has a role in evaluating
the degree to which the domestic social policies of borrowing states are
themselves part of the problem of inadequate capital, and the degree to
which such policies help or hinder the project goals and risk squandering
development capital, which is after all an exhaustible social resource.42
41 Other fruitful areas of inquiry include the Bank’s mission and priorities, how the Bank
selects and evaluates ongoing projects, and how the Bank determines success. See Garcia,
above n 36.
42 Hockett refers to this as the ‘stick’ aspect of Bank operations, or the ways in which the Bank
and other BWI’s implement their policies. See Hockett above n 38, at 195.
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This has been one of the most controversial aspects of the Bank’s
operations, particularly with respect to its participation in Structural
Adjustment Programs or SAPs, through which the Bank seeks in concert
with the IMF to ‘improve resource allocation, increase economic efficiency,
expand growth potential and increase resilience to shocks’.43 This
criticism is largely due to two factors: the Bank’s leverage to insist on
domestic policy reforms, and the controversy surrounding the soundness of
the Bank’s approach to domestic policy.44 The former is essential to the
Bank’s proper stewardship. However, the latter is, and should be, a constant
source of inquiry and criticism both within and without the Bank, as its
experts search for the appropriate blend of policies for each borrowing
state.45
In order to be consistent with the International Difference Principle, the
Bank’s domestic involvement should focus on the degree to which such
policies affect the welfare of the poorest segments of a borrower’s society.46
This can be restated affirmatively as follows:
(IV). The Bank must ensure that its involvement in the domestic policy of
borrowers operates to the benefit of the least advantaged.
Current Bank practices have been criticized for failing to take into account
the redistributive effects of Bank policies.47 Inequalities in wealth distribu-
tion affect economic stability, levels of education, life expectancy, levels of
health care, job training, etc., in short, the factors which are already the
subject of Bank activities. To look at the way in which a country’s social
43 The SAPs themselves have been actually been replaced first by the Enhanced SAPs and most
recently by the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facilities, although following Ghazi I will refer
to all such programs collectively as SAPs. See Ghazi above n 3, at 47–9.
44 I am referring here most recently to the Bank’s neoliberal approach, which has been the
subject of much criticism. See ibid; see generally John W. Head, The Future of the Global
Economic Organizations (Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers, 2005) at 11.
45 Naturally, the more demonstrably sound and ideologically minimal the Bank’s policies are
seen to be, the less its leverage will be resented.
46 I believe this approach is consistent with the Bank’s own responsibilities and Articles and
with the ‘political prohibition’. The purpose of the prohibition is to ensure the Bank acts
impartially: to prevent discrimination based on politics, and the application of leverage
through the Bank by one Member against another. See Jonathon Bradlow, ‘Should the IFIs
play a Role in the Implementation and Enforcement of International Humanitarian Law?
50 University of Kansas Law Review 695 (2002) at 728 (citing legislative history of the
political prohibition); Garcia, above n 36 at 45–8.
47 Although the Bank has moved away from its traditional approach to SAPs, by creating
Poverty Reduction and Growth Facilities based on each borrowing country’s Poverty
Reduction Strategy Paper, and began together with the Fund in 2001 a program of
‘social impact analysis’ (SIA) through which to ‘assess the consequences of policy
interventions. . .on the well-being of different social groups, with a special focus on the
vulnerable and the poor’, the Bank continues to be criticized on this front. See Ghazi
above n 4, at 72. Hockett, for example, argues that BWIs need to take a stronger public
position on the normative justification of such social insurance programs. See Hockett above
n 38, at 198.
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resources are distributed internally among its members is not to act with
partiality. Internal inequalities in wealth are matters of economic policy that
are squarely within the Bank’s mandate.
B. International currency lending: the fund and global inequality
1. The fund’s role in international justice
The starting point is to recall that the Fund is a social institution, whose core
activity is to allocate primary social goods: access to currency reserves,
and the cost of such access. Trade currencies are an exhaustible social
resource.48 As with market size in the case of trade and capital supply in
the case of development, the socioeconomic factors which influence the
market’s determination of which currencies are hard and which are soft,
reflect a complex blend of natural and social inequalities, including the
arbitrary distribution of natural resources and good or bad luck, and
contingent social factors such as sound or unsound policy choices,
colonialism, etc.
The fact that certain currencies are considered hard and others are not,
necessarily creates inequalities in the distribution of trade currencies. This
inequality is in part a function of the fact that currencies are national in
nature, and those countries’ whose economic policies and performance
support the hardness of their currency have a built-in advantage in the
supply of that currency, and in part a function of the larger operation,
inequality and colonial legacy of the global economic system, which
contribute to the hard-currency attributes of some economies, and undercuts
such attributes of others.
Those states whose currencies are hard have an abundance and a capacity
to self generate, whereas those states whose currencies are soft are always at
risk of scarcity and cannot create this resource indigenously.49
Since states have established the Fund to play a central role in allocating
these resources in view of such inequality, this intimately involves the Fund
in distributive justice concerns: by what principles and rules are these social
goods allocated, and to whose benefit? To determine this, we need a theory
of Just International Monetary Policy.
2. Toward a theory of just international monetary policy
As with trade law we looked at the function of market access, here we
look to the Fund’s role as a lender, specifically a balance of payments lender,
48 Accord Lastra, above n 6, at 516 (Fund resources are finite hence their use is subject to
oversight). While it is true that countries whose currencies are hard could in theory print
more money, it is in the very nature of hard currency countries that they not pursue such
policies or risk the tradability of their currency. Therefore, hard currency is in essence
exhaustible even for hard currency countries.
49 I am setting aside for the moment the issue of whether by making better policy choices they
could harden their currency. This would not in any case deal with natural inequalities or
historical contingencies.
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which suggests we focus on access to hard currencies.50 As an initial matter,
access to hard currencies is a function of the private currency market.
The Fund exists to make these currencies available to states which for one
reason or another cannot meet their needs through the export operations of
their private sector, their own central bank reserves, and through the private
currency market.51
The key normative implication of Justice as Fairness for hard currency
lending is that states do not in a significant sense deserve their relative supply
of hard currency, insofar as it is a product, in part, of natural inequalities
which are morally arbitrary, compounded by social inequalities.52 This
means that states cannot be presumed to be entitled to their particular
supply of hard currency, and that resulting inequalities in the distribution of
hard currency must be justified.
This has implications for how states structure the Fund’s operations.
Applying this principle to the Fund’s role as manager of international
currency reserves, we can derive the following as an application of our basic
principle of global distributive justice to the work of the Fund:
(II). In order to justify inequalities in the distribution of trade currencies,
states must ensure that access to trade currencies is structured so as to
benefit the least advantaged.
How does the Fund look from this perspective?
The very existence and mission of the Fund suggest that the Fund plays a
normatively justifiable role, making wealthy states’ abundance of trade
currencies available to states with less access to trade currency. By putting
hard currency to work on near-commercial terms in the economies of states
without adequate indigenous supplies of such currencies, the Fund is
conferring a benefit on less advantaged states.53
However, the facts of inequality mean that, just as in trade it is the case
that reciprocal market access could not in all cases benefit the least
advantaged, so in the case of hard currencies a private market would not be
equally beneficial to all states. Whenever there is a general economic crisis or
a country-specific crisis, it is much harder for certain states to generate or
borrow needed hard currencies. Moreover, the demand for hard currency
50 Hockett suggests a further theoretical link between justice and lending, or as he puts it
between justice theory and finance theory, or an insurance model, namely, that both involve
risk allocation under conditions of uncertainty. See Hockett, above n 38, at 179–181.
51 See ibid., at 194 (existing necessity of both markets, and justice, to the possibility for
international financial institutions to deliver on their social promise).
52 As with development capital supplies, we face the problem of ambition-sensitivity, namely
how to account for the fact that good social policies contribute to an abundance of
development capital. See above n 38 and sources cited therein.
53 Head, above n 44, at 95–6 (documenting the considerable wealth transfers which IMF
facilities have affected for the benefit of the least developed members).
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exceeds currency-poor states’ ability to pay commercial rates, so if the only
access to hard currency was through private banks at commercial rates,
economic opportunities would go unrealized.54
This brings us to the issue of the terms on which the Fund makes hard
currency available. The Fund offers two basic types of facilities: ‘regular’ or
non-concessional facilities, which are not in fact loans but purchase and
repurchase agreements;55 and concessional facilities, which are truly trade
currency loans to developing countries.56 The Fund’s regular facilities
consist of five main lending programs: Stand-By Arrangements, the
Extended Fund Facility, the Supplemental Reserve Facility, Contingent
Credit Lines, and the Compensatory Financing Facility.57 All have varying
eligibility criteria and repayment terms, and charge interest that is slightly
below, but keyed to, market rates.58 The Fund’s concessional facilities
consist of the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facilities (PRGF), which
replaced the earlier SAPs and Enhanced SAPs, and charges only 0.5%
interest per year.59
The terms of access to such currencies through each facility are themselves
a social resource. In other words, the terms on which the Fund makes its
currencies available through regular facilities (preferential rates), and the
terms on which the Fund makes its currencies available through concessional
facilities (concessional rates) are themselves a further socially produced, and
socially allocated, resource.
In this sense, the Fund’s regular facilities lending is similar to the principle
of free trade in WTO and the Bank’s preferential lending through the
IBRD – helping to equalize opportunity to hard currencies in a manner
consistent with the basic requirements of Justice as Fairness. However, in the
same manner that with respect to trade, a system of purely free trade was not
enough due to the facts of inequality; so in hard currency lending a system
of pure private market currency transactions, or even a blended system of
private bank commercial currency transactions and Fund preferential
lending, would not be enough. Because developing countries have limited
domestically generated supplies of hard currency and limited resources to
54 Exporting states would lose sales, importing states much-needed goods and services, and less
advantaged states would be tempted to employ currency controls, devaluations, etc.,
destabilizing the international monetary system to the detriment of all.
55 See Head, above n 44, at 24 (describing operation of SBA and EFF purchase/repurchase
obligations).
56 See Lastra, above n 6, at 517–518.
57 See generally Head, above n 44, at 24–5 (reviewing types of facilities).
58 See Ghazi, above n 3, at 13.
59 See Ibid. One commentator suggests that the category of concessional facilities also includes
special facilities such as the oil facility, accelerated procedures such as the emergency
financing mechanism, and exceptional facilities such as the supplemental reserve facility and
contingent credit line for sudden and disruptive events. See Lastra above n 6 at 519–20. I will
follow the narrower approach and restrict my attention to the PRGF since the rest charge
higher, near-market rates.
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borrow such currencies, they cannot satisfy their need for hard currency
through these avenues, meaning that the overall inequality in currency
supplies will not work to their advantage.
Continuing the analogy to free trade from the previous section, regular
Fund facility lending is necessary, but not sufficient, for international justice.
It is not enough that hard currencies be made available, even at below-
commercial terms. The International Difference Principle asks that hard
currencies be made available under such terms and in such a manner, that it
benefits the least advantaged.
In terms of the International Difference Principle, this suggests the
following corollary:
(IIA). In order that access to trade currencies benefit the least advantaged,
states must offer concessional access to development capital.
The PRGFs are in the balance-of-payments lending context the structural
analog to the WTO’s Special and Differential Treatment policies in trade
and the Bank’s IDA lending – concessional access to hard currencies as a
tool for justifying inequality. They represent that specific aspect of the Fund
which directly addresses the inequality in the distribution of hard currencies
from the perspective of the least advantaged.
This leads to the third step in the process, which can be restated as
follows:
(III) In order to justify inequalities in the distribution of trade currencies,
states must offer concessional access to trade currencies that is structured
so as to benefit the least advantaged.
It is the Fund’s responsibility to see that this most valuable social good –
concessional access to trade currencies – is in fact structured so as to
benefit the least advantaged. How can this be carried out at the operational
level?
C. Operational implications of a theory of just monetary policy
There are many aspects of the Fund’s operations which would seem to meet
the basic thrust of the International Difference Principle, at least at a general
level. To begin with, there is the Fund’s very existence and basic mission.
Moreover, there is the fact that the Fund operates through all of its facilities
almost exclusively with countries that are in some stage of development.
Finally, there is the fact that the Fund does indeed offer concessional hard
currency lending through its PRGF.
However, a thorough evaluation of the justice of the Fund’s
operations, and the full development of a theory of just international
monetary policy, would require taking this general principle, and
deepening the analysis through a program by program evaluation of
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the Fund’s operation: are they in fact structured to benefit the least
advantaged, and do they in fact operate this way? And what does the way the
Fund actually works, suggest about principles of just monetary policy in the
real world?
As with the Bank, I am going to focus in this essay on one area: the Fund’s
involvement in the domestic policies of borrowing states.60
a. Conditionality
Consistent with its prudential obligations, the Fund has a role in evaluating
the degree to which the domestic social policies of borrowing states are
themselves part of the balance of payments problem, and the degree to
which such policies risk squandering Fund currency reserves, which are an
exhaustible social resource.61 The Fund exercises this role through what it
calls ‘conditionality’, which it defines as the link between ‘the approval or
continuation of the Fund’s financing and the implementation of specified
elements of economic policy by the country receiving this financing’.62
Conditionality functions in IMF lending as a substitute for collateral,
through the imposition of policy restrictions on borrowing states as a
condition of releasing credit tranches.63 When a Fund member needs to
draw on the Fund for hard currencies in excess of its own reserve account,
such draws are subject to conditions negotiated between the Fund and the
drawing country. Such conditions can include such sensitive domestic issues
as wage rates, levels of public expenditures, budget deficits and export
levels.64 Similar conditions are also imposed as a function of a borrower’s
participation in the Bank’s HIPC program, through the link between HIPC
and participation in the Fund’s PRGF.65
Conditionality has been one of the most controversial aspects of
the Fund’s operations. The conditions the Fund imposes as a cost of its
intervention, have a tremendous impact on the domestic policies and
development strategies of recipient countries.66 Criticism has been particu-
larly strong with respect to the Fund’s Structural Adjustment Programs or
60 Other promising areas include the Fund’s mission and priorities, its system for allocating
SDRs, its decision making structure, and its system for choosing and evaluating projects.
See Garcia, above n 36; see generally Head above n 44 (summarizing critiques).
61 This is the ‘coercive’ aspect of Fund operations. See Ghazi, above n 3, at 5; Hockett, above
n 38, at 195.
62 IMF, ‘Conditionality in Fund-Supported Programs – Overview’, http://www.imf.org/external/
np/pdr/cond/2001/eng/overview/index.htm (last visited 8 June, 2007).
63 Lastra, above n 6, at 517.
64 See generally Ghazi, above n 3, at 16–7.
65 Charles Abugre, SAPping the Poor: Structural Adjustment – the Forgotten Issue, www.wdm.
org.uk/resources/reports/debt/sapping the poor01061999.pdf (June 1999) (citing link between
HIPC participation and PRGF).
66 See generally Ngaire Woods, Order, Globalization, and Inequality in World Politics, in Andrew
Hurrell and Ngaire Woods (eds), Inequality, Globalization and World Politics (Oxford, U.K.:
Oxford University Press, 1999) 30–33 (surveying impact of IMF).
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SAPs, and the successor Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility.67 As with
the Bank, such criticism is largely due to two factors: the leverage the Fund
has by virtue of its role to insist on domestic policy reforms,68 and the
controversy surrounding the soundness and ideological basis of the Fund’s
approach to domestic policy.69
Although the Fund has begun to acknowledge shortcomings in its
conditionality and structural adjustment programs,70 Justice as Fairness
requires more than a recognition of problems in the implementation of the
Fund’s policies – it requires a radical re-examination of the Fund’s
conditionality program.
What principles or criteria should guide this re-evaluation? According to
this analysis, it should be the International Difference Principle, restated as
follows:
(IV). The Fund must ensure that its involvement in the
domestic policy of borrowers operates to the benefit of the least
advantaged.
Current Fund practices have been criticized for failing to adequately
take into account the redistributive effects of Fund policies.71 While the
Fund has begun to publicly note the distributive impact of its policies,72
and develop new approaches to conditionality,73 such policies continue to be
criticized,74 and require a sustained normative reevaluation according to the
international difference principle, so that the inequality in international
67 See Ghazi, above n 3, at 47 (1990 Bank paper).
68 But see Head, above n 44, at 75 (downplaying the leverage aspects of conditionality in view of
borrowing countries’ formal right to say no).
69 I am referring here to the Fund’s ideological approach, which has been called ‘unrepentant
neoliberalism’. Deacon, above n 1, at 220; see generally Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and its
Discontents (New York, NY: W.W. Norton, 2003). But see Head, above n 44, at 61–63, 69–75
(summarizing and rejecting the ideology, or what he calls the ‘bad medicine’, critique).
70 See Head, above n 44, at 72–73 (discussing 2002 reforms to Fund conditionality policies).
71 See, e.g. Head, above n 44, at 81–84 (summarizing and largely endorsing the distributive
critique of Fund policies). Hockett, for example, argues that BWIs need to take a stronger
public position on the normative justification of social insurance programs. Hockett, above
n 38, at 198.
72 Hockett, above n 38, at 223.
73 The Fund now guides its PRGF lending through Poverty Strategy Reduction Papers,
designed in consultation with borrowing states, and supplemented since 2001 by the ‘social
impact analysis’ (SIA) program, through which the Fund attempts to assess the consequences
of its conditionality policies on the well-being of different social groups, with a special focus
on the vulnerable and the poor. IMF Annual Report 2003 at 44. However, these reforms do
not specifically address the most critical issue highlighted by the International Difference
Principle, namely that conditionality policies be specifically tailored to benefit the least
advantaged. Even the SIA is intended more to mitigate adverse effects rather than to make
the benefit of the least advantaged a policy priority.
74 See, e.g. Ghazi above n 3, at 72; Abugre, above n 65; but see Head, above n 44, at 82 (equity
criticisms understate Fund efforts in this area).
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currency resources can be effectively put in the service of the least
advantaged.75
III. CONCLUSION
Justice as Fairness presents a very basic question to states in their
international economic relations: given the facts of inequality, their arbitrary
nature, and their adverse effects on the least advantaged, how can the
international economic system be re-structured to ensure that such inequal-
ities work to the benefit of the least advantaged? In general the Bank and
Fund are in fact doing much that is consistent with international egalitarian
justice, but they can and should do more. In this respect, the International
Difference Principle can offer normative guidance as to precisely what more
the Bank and Fund should do. I have sought in this essay to illustrate in one
area of Bank and Fund activity – their involvement in borrowers’ domestic
policies – the sort of normative guidance which such an analysis can offer, as
the Bank and Fund seek to reform their policies in this area. Using the
normative framework of justice is itself a subtle but significant change in
emphasis – one commentator has likened it to a ‘Gestalt shift’76 – that offers
valuable substantive and political benefits. The states which set Bank and
Fund policy should more explicitly embrace and articulate the redistributive
aspect of the BWIs and couch their efforts in the language of justice. To
refuse to do so is to court the danger that Bank and Fund policies will serve
a particular hidden theory of justice, not, as claimed, to avoid entangling the
Bank and Fund in such issues at all. If justice means ensuring that
inequalities in the international distribution of social goods work to the
benefit of the least advantaged, then states must ensure, among other things,
that the Bank and Fund delve far enough into domestic social policy and
with appropriate criteria, to reach and affect those structures that actually
determine whether capital and currency inequalities will or will not work to
the benefit of the least advantaged.
75 See also, e.g. Namita Wahi, ‘Human Rights Accountability of the IMF and the World Bank:
A Critique of Existing Mechanisms and Articulation of a Theory of Horizontal
Accountability’, 12 U.C. Davis Journal of International Law & Policy 331 (2006) (critical
of conditionality from a human rights perspective); Ofer Eldar, ‘Reform of IMF
Conditionality: A Proposal for Self-imposed Conditionality’, 8 Journal of International
Economic Law. 509 (2005) (proposing that conditionality be entirely borrower-driven, with
Fund approval).
76 See Hockett, above n 38 at 169.
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